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NOTES
VULNERABILITY AS A LAUNCHING STATE:
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADOPT
EXPLICIT INDEMNIFICATION
PROCEDURES IN RESPONSE TO THE
GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL SPACE
INDUSTRY
MOLLIE CARNEY†
INTRODUCTION
I believe that space travel will one day become as common as
airline travel is today. I’m convinced, however, that the true
future of space travel does not lie with government
agencies . . . but real progress will come from private companies
competing to provide the ultimate adventure ride . . . .1

On July 11, 1979, in the desert of Australia, the sky was
falling.2 A seventy-seven-ton United States space station called
Skylab—at the time, the largest object to ever be in orbit3—
“decayed faster than expected” and fell from orbit.4 To mitigate
anticipated destruction, NASA tried to orchestrate the station’s
reentry path so that Skylab would land in the Indian Ocean, but
†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2022, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2019, George Washington University. Thank you to
Professor Christopher Borgen for his advice on this Note. Thank you also to my
parents—none of my accomplishments would be possible without your love,
understanding, and encouragement. Finally, thank you to the editors of the St.
John’s Law Review for their hard work and insightful suggestions.
1
BUZZ ALDRIN & KEN ABRAHAM, MAGNIFICENT DESOLATION: THE LONG
JOURNEY HOME FROM THE MOON 582–83 (2009) (ebook).
2
Richard D. Lyons, Skylab Debris Hits Australian Desert; No Harm Reported,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 1979), https://nyti.ms/1iiiOaK [https://perma.cc/W8EY-CV5Z].
3
Id.; see also Rebecca J. Rosen, The Strange Tale of the Skylab’s Fall from Orbit,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2011/09/the-strange-tale-of-the-skylabs-fall-from-orbit/245332/
[https://perma.cc/
QQV9-982K].
4
Elizabeth Howell, Skylab: First U.S. Space Station, SPACE.COM (July 11,
2018), https://www.space.com/19607-skylab.html [https://perma.cc/N3KD-W4MK].
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the station reentered the atmosphere “several thousand miles
farther down its orbital track than had been expected.”5 As a
result, pieces of the fallen space station landed across western
Australia rather than in the sea as planned.6
Luckily, Skylab’s descent caused no real damage,7 and
therefore there were no legal ramifications.8 Because Western
Australia is largely desert, there was not much risk of property
damage.9 But, what if the pieces of Skylab had fallen, for
example, in modern-day Mumbai—the most densely populated
city on Earth?10 In this scenario, significant destruction would
have likely resulted.
Had damage occurred, Australia would have been able to
bring a claim against the United States of America under a
treaty known as the Liability Convention,11 regardless of whether
the damage was caused by NASA or a United States private
launch company.12 If claims were brought against the United
States for damage caused by a private company, the United
States would be responsible for compensating the claimant
State.13 In this scenario, it remains unclear whether the United
States government could hold the private company responsible
and whether the private company would have to reimburse the
United States government.14
This Note argues that the current United States launch
license requirements should be amended to include explicit
indemnification procedures, should the United States be held
liable for damages as a Launching State under the Liability
Convention. Part I of this Note examines the evolution of the
space industry from a field marked by Cold War tensions to one
that is dominated by private industry, and the risks that are
5

See Lyons, supra note 2.
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 106–07 (2d ed.
2018).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Lyons, supra note 2.
10
Elzy Kolb, 75,000 People Per Square Mile? These are the Most Densely
Populated Cities in the World, USA TODAY (July 11, 2019), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/world/2019/07/11/the-50-most-densely-populated-cities-in-theworld/39664259/ [https://perma.cc/7C4G-DB5U].
11
See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
12
Id. art. 1.
13
Id. art. 2–3.
14
See infra Part III.
6
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associated with the rapid growth of the commercial space
industry. Part II will explain the current legal regime by
(1) setting a framework of liability generally, (2) examining the
Liability Convention of 1972, and (3) examining the current
United States regulations regarding launch licensing
requirements. Part III of this Note will analyze the shortcomings
of the current United States regulations, namely the lack of
specific indemnification procedures. Lastly, Part IV will compare
the regulations of the United States with those of other nations
which have sophisticated commercial launch providers, namely
Australia and France, to examine how explicit indemnification
procedures may be implemented.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Evolution of Space Launches and the Role of the Private
Industry

On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik-1 into the
Earth’s orbit.15 This launch marked the dawn of the space age16
and shocked American experts who grew concerned that the
United States was falling behind in the race to develop new
technology.17 In the wake of the Sputnik launch, President
Eisenhower poured resources into the space program, and United
States policymakers worked to accelerate the space program and
weapons development.18 In December 1957, the first American
artificial satellite, Vanguard, exploded on its launchpad.19 This
failure was soon rectified when the Explorer launched in January

15
A Timeline of the Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFF.’S,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KQ5D-7XBN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022); see also Sputnik and the
Dawn of the Space Age: Chronology of Sputnik/Vanguard/Explorer Events 1957-58,
NASA HIST. DIV. [hereinafter Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age],
https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/Z4Z8-UMEX] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2022).
16
See Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, supra note 15.
17
Sputnik, 1957, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN SERV.’S INST., U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/sputnik (last visited Apr. 10,
2022); see also R. Cargill Hall, Civil-Military Relations in America’s Early Space
Program, in THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN SPACE 1945 TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21,
27–28 (R. Cargill Hall & Jacob Neufeld eds., 1995).
18
Sputnik, 1957, supra note 17.
19
Vanguard Rocket Test, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/
image_feature_926.html [https://perma.cc/8TPD-QBCA] (Aug. 7, 2017).
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1958.20 Over the next two decades, Cold War tensions between
the United States and the USSR escalated and spilled over into
space exploration; each nation sought to outdo the other in what
became known as the “Space Race.”21 In December 1958, the
United Nations established the ad-hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Use of Outer Space to “dicuss[ ] the scientific and legal
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space.”22 Ultimately,
the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space gave rise to a
series of multilateral treaties which govern space activities.23
While the early days of American space activities were
defined by military developments and Cold War tensions, the
United States’ government-led space activities relied on private
industry, namely for manufacturing purposes.24 Beginning in
1963, private expendable launch vehicle (“ELV”) manufacturers
produced vehicles for the government: Titan rockets were built by
Martin Marietta; Atlas rockets by General Dynamics; Delta
rockets by McDonnell Douglas; and Scout rockets by LTV
Aerospace Corporation.25 Sixteen years later, in 1979, the
European Space Agency launched its first ELV, becoming the
first entity to compete with the United States government in the
global launch provider market.26
In 1978, the United States began to phase out all but one of
the ELVs in favor of the United States space shuttle, which
would eventually take all United States government and
commercial satellites into orbit.27 NASA declared the shuttle
20

Explorer 1 Overview, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/explorer/
explorer-overview.html [https://perma.cc/7JFQ-TTNM] (Aug. 3, 2017).
21
Maddie Davis, The Space Race: Soviets and Americans Race to the Stars,
UNIV. OF VA., MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educationalresources/space-race [https://perma.cc/9EML-ETU4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
22
Ethel Baraona, Space – New World Colony?, ROCA GALLERY (Jan. 3, 2019),
http://www.rocagallery.com/space-new-world-colony [https://perma.cc/H2M9-9E5B].
23
See Treaties, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.’S, https://www.unoosa.org/
oosa/en/aboutus/history/treaties.html [https://perma.cc/WM6K-2TQR] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2022); infra Part II.B.
24
Origins of the Commercial Space Industry, FAA 1, 1 (Nov. 24, 2014),
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/milestones/media/Commercial_Space_Industry.pdf.
25
Id.; For much of this time, the U.S. government served as the sole commercial
provider of space travel, as private companies and foreign governments had to
contract with NASA to launch their communications satellites on ELVs. Id.
26
Id.; see also John Krige, The Decision Taken in the Early 1970s to Develop an
Expendable European Heavy Satellite Launcher, in 2 A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN
SPACE AGENCY 1958–1987: THE STORY OF THE ESA, 1973 TO 1987 389, 389 (R.A.
Harris ed., 2000).
27
Origins of the Commercial Space Industry, supra note 24; see also Donald J.
Kutyna, Indispensable: Space Systems in the Persian Gulf War, in THE U.S. AIR
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operational in 1982 and the government stopped funding the
production of ELVs in 1983.28 However, the flight schedule of the
shuttle “could not meet all of the [United States’] security, civil,
and commercial launch requirements,”29 leading some launch
vehicle manufacturers to offer commercial launch services.30
Though American private companies started to see successful
test launches by 1982, the process of obtaining approval for such
launches was time-consuming and cumbersome.31 As a result,
policymakers eased the process with the goal of spurring growth
in the commercial space industry throughout the 1980s.32 On
August 15, 1986, over six months after the Challenger explosion,
President Reagan announced that NASA would “no longer be in
the business of launching private satellites,” and that private
companies would “take over.”33
In recent years, the commercial space industry has seen
rapid expansion. In 2010, The Space Report showed that the
global space economy grew almost 40% in five years.34 Since
then, the global space economy has continued to grow and, as of
2019, was reported to be $423.8 billion.35 Of this, space products
and services—a key driver of commercial space revenue, which
includes launches36—were valued at $217.72 billion in 2019, a
1.7% increase from 2018.37 Space infrastructure and support
industries—the other main sector of commercial space revenue—
FORCE IN SPACE 1945 TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 103, 105 (R. Cargill Hall &
Jacob Neufeld eds., 1995).
28
Origins of the Commercial Space Industry, supra note 24.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1–3.
33
Ronald W. Reagan, President of the U.S., Statement on the Building of a
Fourth Shuttle Orbiter and the Future of the Space Program (Aug. 15, 1986), in THE
PUB. PAPERS OF PRESIDENT RONALD W. REAGAN 1111, https://www.reagan
library.gov/archives/speech/statement-building-fourth-shuttle-orbiter-and-futurespace-program [https://perma.cc/378E-Y8UY].
34
Space Found., The Space Report Reveals Steady Space Growth, 9 SPACE
WATCH (2010), https://www.spacefoundation.org/2010/05/02/the-space-report-revealssteady-space-growth/ [https://perma.cc/VAU2-3DXM].
35
Global Space Economy Grows in 2019 to $423.8 Billion, The Space Report
2020 Q2 Analysis Shows, SPACE FOUND. (July 30, 2020) [hereinafter Global Space
Economy Grows in 2019 to $423.8 Billion], https://www.spacefoundation.org/2020/
07/30/global-space-economy-grows-in-2019-to-423-8-billion-the-space-report-2020-q2analysis-shows/ [https://perma.cc/J75F-A2NY].
36
Id.; Commercial Space: Overview, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/
commercial-space [https://perma.cc/7YX9-CA78] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
37
Global Space Economy Grows in 2019 to $423.8 Billion, supra note 35.
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totaled $119.17 billion, a 16.1% increase from 2018.38 In total,
commercial space revenue increased by 6.3% from 2018, and in
2019 accounted for 79.49% of the global space economy.39
Morgan Stanley estimated in 2020 that the global space industry
could generate more than $1 trillion in revenue by 2040, up from
this year’s $350 billion—a 185.71% increase over the course of
twenty years.40 The space industry is also growing globally:
already, close to fifty nations have government space budgets,
nine of which are over $1 billion, and nearly twenty of them
under $100 million but at least over $20 million.41
B. Risk Associated with Developing Private Launch Programs
Society’s reliance on satellites in an increasingly connected
world creates enthusiasm for investment in the private launch
industry and a desire to keep space accessible to private launch
providers.42 This dependence will inevitably lead to rapid
advancement of the private launch industry. As the industry
develops, private launch providers must experiment to determine
which technologies and techniques will be the future of the
industry. Just as Cold War nations that sought to win the Space
Race embraced risk and were often met with failure on their
journey to orbit, private launch providers seeking profit and
repute encounter risk and failure as they embark on that very
same path.43
Space Exploration Technologies (“SpaceX”), a company that
designs, manufactures, and launches rockets, was founded in
2002 by Elon Musk and began grabbing headlines when it
became the first private company to launch a payload into orbit
and successfully return the payload unharmed in 2010.44 The
38

Id.
Id.
40
Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, MORGAN STANLEY (July 24, 2020),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space#:~:text=Morgan%20
Stanley%20estimates%20that%20the,from%20satellite%20broadband%20Internet%
20access [https://perma.cc/7KBE-GHAQ].
41
BRYCE SPACE AND TECH., GLOBAL SPACE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 1 (2019),
https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/global_space_industry_dyna
mics_-_research_paper.pdf. The nine space actors with budgets that exceed $1 billion
are: the United States, China, Europe (collectively), Russia, India, Japan, France,
Germany, and Italy. Id. at 3.
42
Id. at 5.
43
See supra Part I.A.
44
Jeffrey Kluger, 10 Things to Know About SpaceX, TIME, https://time.com/
space-x-ten-things-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/E4G9-H66J] (last visited Apr. 10,
39
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company is perhaps the most well-known private aerospace
company and has contracts with NASA, the United States
military, and private companies seeking to launch satellites.45
SpaceX has launched most of its rockets from three locations in
the continental United States.46 The only foreign site, Omelek
Island located in the northern Pacific Ocean, was used for
SpaceX’s earliest launch attempts from 2006 until 2009.47 Since
then, all missions have been conducted from two launchpads in
Cape Canaveral, Florida, and from a third launchpad in
California–the Space Launch Complex 4E at Vanderberg Air
Force Base.48 Between 2006 and 2019, SpaceX conducted 86
launches, five of which have failed.49
Two minutes into a June 2015 flight, a SpaceX Falcon 9
rocket exploded, destroying the entire capsule, and with it, all
the supplies destined for the International Space Station.50
NASA lost $118 million for the cargo on the launch,51 and SpaceX
lost $260 million.52 An additional $200 million was lost in
September 2016 when another SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket exploded

2022). A “payload” is what is being brought into space, which varies depending on
the mission of the launch. Payloads can be fireworks, missiles, satellites, people,
animals, or anything else launched into orbit. Payload Systems, NASA,
https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/rocket/payload.html
[https://perma.cc/2G4ENR6V] (May 13, 2021).
45
Kluger, supra note 44; Clay Dillow, SpaceX Poised to Win First U.S. Military
Mission, FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/11/17/spacex-militarymission/ [https://perma.cc/DP37-D7HB]; Jeff Foust, NASA Selects Boeing and
SpaceX for Commercial Crew Contracts, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014),
https://spacenews.com/41891nasa-selects-boeing-and-spacex-for-commercial-crewcontracts/ [https://perma.cc/L5MX-P7BC].
46
Júlia Ledur, Falcon Flights, REUTERS GRAPHICS (Dec. 5, 2019), https://gra
phics.reuters.com/SPACE-EXPLORATION-SPACEX/010091Q82NF/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UWR5-U5PK].
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Jessica Lovering et al., Commercial Spaceflight, BREAKTHROUGH INST. (Apr.
26,
2017),
https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/commercial-spaceflight#
Major%20Setbacks%20in%20Innovation [https://perma.cc/A3P4-WG96].
51
NASA, NASA’S RESPONSE TO SPACEX’S JUNE 2015 LAUNCH FAILURE: IMPACTS
ON COMMERCIAL RESUPPLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 1 (2016),
https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-16-025.pdf.
52
Rolfe Winkler & Andy Pasztor, Exclusive Peek at SpaceX Data Shows Loss in
2015, Heavy Expectations for Nascent Internet Service, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/exclusive-peek-at-spacex-data-shows-loss-in-2015heavy-expectations-for-nascent-internet-service-1484316455#:~:text=The%20com
pany%20lost%20%24260%20million,year%3B%20instead%20it%20launched%20six
[https://perma.cc/M6U3-T9LZ].
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during a prelaunch test and destroyed a communications satellite
payload.53
Though SpaceX regularly dominates headlines, it is not the
only United States commercial launch provider. As of October
2020, ten other companies have active launch licenses with the
Federal Aviation Administration, including Orbital Sciences
Corp., Rocket Lab Global, United Launch Alliance, Virgin
Galactic, Virgin Orbit, Exos Aerospace, Astra Space, Inc.,
Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services, Blue Origin, and
S7 Sea Launch Limited.54 However, these companies engage in
various types of activities. For example, both Virgin Origin and
Virgin Galactic are a part of Virgin Group’s commercial space
portfolio, Galactic Ventures, but Virgin Origin performs small
satellite launch services while Virgin Galactic is a “commercial
spaceline” and focuses on making progress in human
spaceflight.55
Additionally, although Lockheed Martin
Commercial Launch Services has two active launch licenses,56
United Launch Alliance—the joint firm between Boeing and
Lockheed Martin—took over providing launch services on behalf
of Lockheed Martin in 2018.57 The remaining eight companies
offer launch services for payloads.58 From January to October
53

Lovering et al., supra note 50.
Commercial Space Data: Licenses, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/
commercial_space_data/licenses/ [https://perma.cc/2FGD-8QPX] (Aug. 20, 2021, 9:40
AM).
55
Virgin Galactic Announces New Commercial Space Company Virgin Orbit
Featuring LauncherOne Small Satellite Launch Service, VIRGIN ORBIT (Mar. 26,
2017), https://virginorbit.com/the-latest/virgin-galactic-announces-new-commercialspace-company-virgin-orbit-featuring-launcherone-small-satellite-launch-service/
[https://perma.cc/DW74-6G7J].
56
One of these licenses is effective from December 14, 2016, until December 13,
2021, and the other from December 20, 2016, until December 19, 2021. Commercial
Space Data: Licenses, supra note 54.
57
David Todd, Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services Will Be No More
as ULA Takes Over Role, SERADATA (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.seradata.com/
lockheed-martin-commercial-launch-services-will-be-no-more-as-ula-takes-over-role/
[https://perma.cc/LX37-5YCX].
58
Services, ASTRA, https://astra.com/services/ [https://perma.cc/W56Q-VJY2]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2022); Rocket Lab, ROCKET LAB USA, https://www.rocket
labusa.com/ [https://perma.cc/M7SP-CZLX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022); Launch
Services, UNITED LAUNCH ALL., https://www.ulalaunch.com/launch-services
[https://perma.cc/842F-62RS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022); Who We Are, EXOS
AEROSPACE, https://exosaero.com/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/W5NH-CZBH] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2022); VIRGIN ORBIT, https://virginorbit.com/ [https://per
ma.cc/NQV2-DHZ6] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022); Fly a Payload on New Glenn, BLUE
ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/new-glenn/fly-payload-new-glenn [https://per
ma.cc/LW9Q-5KSA] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022); Sea Launch, S7 SPACE,
54

2022]

VULNERABILITY AS A LAUNCHING STATE

195

2020, twenty-nine launches took place in the United States, three
of which were considered failures.59
On May 25, 2020, Virgin Orbit conducted its first test launch
of LauncherOne.60 The mission was terminated shortly after
release from its aircraft due to a premature shutdown of the first
stage’s engine to break in a propellant feed line—a cause Virgin
Orbit officials called an “anomaly.”61 Only a mass simulator was
on board LauncherOne, a common practice for the first launch of
a rocket.62
On July 4, 2020, Rocket Lab launched its Electron rocket
from the Mahia Peninsula in New Zealand.63 A detached
electrical connector caused mission failure, which resulted in the
destruction of the launch vehicle and seven payloads onboard.64
Until this failure, Electron’s record consisted of 53 successful
launches of customer payloads into orbit.65 In a conference call
with reporters following the failure, founder and CEO of Rocket
Lab Peter Beck noted, “This is the launch industry, and
unfortunately these things do happen.”66

https://s7space.ru/en/ [https://perma.cc/G2LU-3AJY] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022);
Smallsat
Rideshare
Program,
SPACEX,
https://www.spacex.com/rideshare/
[https://perma.cc/72LY-Y8X4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
59
Commercial Space Data: Licensed Launches, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
data_research/commercial_space_data/launches/?type=Licensed
[https://perma.cc/
GR78-5JVY] (Feb. 18, 2020, 10:21 AM); see infra Part I.B.
60
Thomas Burghardt, Virgin Orbit’s First Orbital Launch Attempt Terminated
Shortly After Release, NASASPACEFLIGHT.COM (May 25, 2020), https://www.nasa
spaceflight.com/2020/05/virgin-orbit-first-orbital-launch-launcherone/
[https://per
ma.cc/35CV-JP74].
61
Stephen Clark, Virgin Orbit Traces Cause of LauncherOne Engine Failure to
Propellant Line, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (July 25, 2020), https://spaceflightnow.com/
2020/07/25/virgin-orbit-traces-cause-of-launcherone-test-flight-mishap-to-propellantline/#:~:text=Virgin%20Orbit’s%20first%20orbital%20launch,in%20a%20propellant
%20feed%20line [https://perma.cc/7RCS-BUUH]; Jeff Foust, Virgin Orbit First
Launch Attempt Fails, SPACE NEWS (May 25, 2020), https://spacenews.com/virginorbit-first-launch-attempt-fails/ [https://perma.cc/6PML-2ZYT].
62
Burghardt, supra note 60.
63
Commercial Space Data: Licensed Launches, supra note 59.
64
Darrell Etherington, Rocket Lab Launch Fails During Rocket’s Second-Stage
Burn, Causing a Loss of Vehicle and Payloads, TECH CRUNCH (July 4, 2020, 6:50
PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/04/rocket-lab-launch-fails-during-rockets-second
-stage-burn-causing-a-loss-of-vehicle-and-payloads/ [https://perma.cc/3JF9-VYU4].
65
Stephen Clark, Rocket Lab Identifies Faulty Electrical Connector as Cause of
Launch Failure, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (July 31, 2020), https://spaceflightnow.com/
2020/07/31/rocket-lab-identifies-faulty-electrical-connector-as-cause-of-launchfailure/ [https://perma.cc/N7CP-7HGU].
66
Id.
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On September 12, Astra Space, Inc. launched Astra Rocket3.1.67 The flight, however, terminated about 30 seconds after
launch due to oscillations that pushed the rocket off course.68
Even so, Astra said it was a “beautiful launch” that provided
“valuable experience, plus even more valuable flight data,” and
noted that it expects it to take three flights before it successfully
reaches orbit.69 Astra also specified that it plans to “learn fast
through iterative development.”70
These recent failures indicate that the industry gives newer
private launch providers “more leeway when an accident does
occur” because these companies consider failure as necessary to
learning and ultimately achieving their goals.71 For example,
less than two months after Rocket Lab’s Electron was destroyed,
Rocket Lab successfully launched Electron Photon-LEO, which
brought a small satellite into orbit and marked Rocket Lab’s
fourteenth successful launch.72 Indeed, the July 2020 failure was
not considered a major setback but part of the iterative process.
Additionally, Astra’s remarks that the September 12 failure was
“beautiful” is more than a search for silver linings. Astra’s
primary objective for that launch was to achieve “nominal first
stage burn;” officials noted that the company aimed to learn
enough from the Rocket 3.1 launch for it to successfully achieve
orbit within three flights.73 Astra further reported, “No matter
what happens with Rocket 3.1, we’ve ensured that we are set up
to learn, improve, and return to the launch pad with a more
capable vehicle as quickly as possible.”74 Commercial launch

67

Commercial Space Data: Licensed Launches, supra note 59.
Chris C. Kemp & Adam London, We Have Lift Off, ASTRA (Sept. 12, 2020),
https://astra.com/blog/we-have-lift-off/ [https://perma.cc/GP4H-DM7U]; Jeff Foust,
Astra Launch Terminated During First Stage Burn, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://spacenews.com/astra-launch-terminated-during-first-stage-burn/
[https://perma.cc/GYE5-SHRH].
69
Kemp & London, supra note 68.
70
Id.
71
Miriam Kramer, Why the Private Space Industry Embraces Risk, AXIOS (Sept.
1, 2020), https://www.axios.com/private-space-industry-risk-9a595298-d2f3-44a5bcd3-cf7e8d20964a.html [https://perma.cc/L6BK-U53K].
72
Loren Grush, Rocket Lab Returns to Flight Less than Two Months After
Launch Failure, VERGE (Aug. 31, 2020, 9:17 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
8/31/21408378/rocket-lab-electron-return-to-flight-capella-space-sequoia-satellite?
stream=science [https://perma.cc/73JC-Y9P4].
73
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providers are capable of embracing risk and are prepared to fail
on the road to success.75
While it is crucial that private launch providers are willing
to take the sort of risks that advance the industry, it is also
important that companies and policymakers remain cognizant of
both the degree and nature of risks associated with such
progress. In the above examples, the financial ramifications of
the risk embraced and failures experienced impacted the launch
providers themselves—especially in the instances of test
launches.76
The financial repercussions have increased
significance, however, when more experienced companies such as
Rocket Lab or SpaceX fail because their flights often carry
payloads.77 Therefore, financial loss is experienced not only by
the launch providers, but also by the owners of the payloads.78
As more private launch providers become stable and able to
perform missions rather than simply test launches, the
ramifications of failure gain significance even though the
perceived chances of failure might lessen.
In addition to
remaining aware of the risk that is passed to their clients when
launches occur, private launch providers must consider the risk
failure poses to the public should property damage or casualties
result from a disastrous launch. Because of the inherent
riskiness of launches, regulations need to balance protection of
the public with industry growth in a way that encourages private
companies to pursue advancement responsibly.
II. THE LEGAL REGIME
A.

General Liability

Risks in transporting goods from point A to point B, like
from a launch site to the International Space Station, are not
unique to the commercial space industry; there are risks, and
therefore liability allocations, associated with any commercial
transportation. For example, barring waivers of liability, any
customer can sue FedEx for damages if their package is
destroyed while a delivery truck brings it across town.79 When a
75
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See Etherington, supra note 64; see also Lovering et al., supra note 50.
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party entrusts cargo to a delivery service and the cargo is
destroyed, the party may hold the delivery service liable.80 This
holds true across methods of delivery.81 If the same person
instead shipped a package across the country and it was
destroyed on FedEx’s delivery plane, she could still recover
damages from FedEx.82 If, in addition to the package sent, all of
the plane’s cargo was destroyed because the plane, manufactured
by Boeing and operated by FedEx, crashed due to engine failure,
everyone who had cargo on the plane could sue the aircraft
manufacturer and operator—here Boeing and FedEx—for
damages.83
This would also be true if the French government had cargo
on the flight that was destroyed; it too could sue the aircraft
operator and manufacturer for damages.84 Such a suit would be
in accordance not only with the policies of the shipping company,
but also with international law.85 The same principles apply
when cargo is destroyed on an international flight.86 Under
international agreements, a carrier is “liable for damage
sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage
to” cargo if the damage was caused during air carriage.87
The scenario becomes more complicated when the cargo in
question is a communications satellite, the destination is the
International Space Station, and the mode of transportation is a
rocket. Unlike delivery services that utilize planes and trucks,
the manufacturer of a rocket is often also the party providing
commercial launch services.88 Therefore, fewer parties may be
sued in the event of damage. If a private company, such as
80
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Facebook, sends a communications satellite to space on a rocket
and the cargo is destroyed, then Facebook could proceed just as it
would if its cargo had been destroyed on a plane or a truck:
Facebook could sue the launch provider regardless of where the
launch occurred so long as the laws of that country allowed such
action.89 Similarly, if the United States government contracted
with a United States based commercial launch provider to send
cargo to space and the cargo was destroyed, the government
could proceed by suing the launch provider.90 However, if the
destroyed cargo belonged to a foreign government, the foreign
government could either take action against the launch provider
or against the United States as a launching State under the
Liability Convention of 1972.91
B. International Law
The global space industry has been governed by
international agreements since 1967.92 The Outer Space Treaty
of 1967 established the freedom of exploration and use of outer
space for the benefit of all countries, and prohibited
appropriation of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, and the deployment of any weapons of mass
destruction into outer space.93 This was later supplemented by
other international agreements,94 including (1) the Rescue
Agreement of 1968, which requires States to assist any astronaut
in case of an accident, distress, emergency, or unintended
landing;95 (2) the Liability Convention of 1972, which establishes
the standards of liability for damage caused by space objects;96
(3) the Registration Convention of 1975, which requires States to
register all objects launched into outer space with the United
89
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Nations;97 and (4) the Moon Agreement of 1979, which explains
how the Outer Space Treaty applies to the Moon and other
celestial bodies.98
The Liability Convention of 1972 governs the assignment of
liability between States in the event of damage during activity in
outer space or during launch or reentry.99 Article I establishes a
list of key definitions. Under the treaty, “damage” means “loss of
life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical,
or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”100
“[L]aunching State” constitutes either a “State which launches or
procures the launching of a space object” or a “State from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched.”101 Further, the
term “launch[]” includes attempted launches.102 This means that
the United States, for example, is the launching State for any
launches occurring on United States soil, regardless of what
party commissions the launch or where that party is from.
Articles II–VII of the Liability Convention outline the scope
of liability for relevant damage. Under Article II, a launching
State is absolutely liable for compensation to claimant States for
damage caused by its space object to Earth’s surface or to an
aircraft in flight.103 Article III establishes that if damage is
caused to a space object or its contents by a space object of
another launching State, then the latter can be held liable if it is
at fault.104 Neither article imposes a limitation on liability. In
the event that a launching State is subject to absolute liability,105
“exoneration . . . shall be granted to the extent that . . . the
damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross
negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical
persons it represents.”106 This exoneration does not apply when
97

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
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damage is caused by the launching State’s engagement in
activities that are not in conformity with international law.107
Furthermore, Article VII precludes the application of the
Liability Convention when a launching State’s space object
damages its own nationals or foreign nationals who are
participating in the operation of that space object.108 Such
participation begins at the time of the launching of the space
object “or at any stage thereafter until its descent.”109 It also
includes any time in which a foreign national is “in the
immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the
result of an invitation by [the] launching State.”110
A claimant State is not required to exhaust available local
remedies prior to presenting a launching State with a claim for
compensation under the Liability Convention, though it cannot
present a claim under the Convention for the same damage that
“is being pursued in the courts or administrative tribunals or
agencies of a launching State or under another international
agreement which is binding on the States concerned.”111 A
claimant State, or any natural or juridical persons it represents,
may pursue local remedies and subsequently present a claim for
the same damage under the Liability Convention once these
remedies have been exhausted. Additionally, a claimant State
may pursue local remedies for compensation for hypothetical
damage A, while presenting a claim under the Liability
Convention for compensation for hypothetical damage B.
The Liability Convention has only been used to present
claims once, and in that instance, a settlement was reached
outside of the procedures outlined within the Liability
Convention.112 On January 24, 1978, a Soviet radar surveillance
satellite, Cosmos 954, fell from orbit and crashed into the
northwestern territories of Canada.113 The satellite fragmented
into approximately 4,000 pieces and scattered over a largely
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uninhabited area the size of Austria.114
Because several
thousand pieces contained “cores [composed] of nearly pure
uranium-235,” Canada claimed that these pieces had “lethal
level[s] of radioactivity.”115 Canada brought suit against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article II of the
Liability Convention and “general principles of international
law,” arguing that “[t]he intrusion of the Cosmos 954 satellite
into Canada’s air space and the deposit on Canadian territory of
hazardous radioactive debris from the satellite constitute[d] a
violation of Canada’s sovereignty.”116 In its claim, Canada
identified the USSR as the launching State of Cosmos 954 and
asserted that the USSR was therefore absolutely liable for
$6,041,174.70 (Canadian), though the total cost of the cleanup
was estimated to be $14 million (Canadian).117 In settlement
proceedings, the Soviet Union ultimately agreed to pay $3 million
(Canadian).118
C. Domestic Law
In March 2012, the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer
Space (“COPUOS”) issued recommendations on national
legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space.119 In doing so, COPUOS observed “that, in view of the
increasing participation of private actors in space activities,
appropriate action at the national level is needed, in particular
with respect to the authorization and supervision of nongovernmental space activities.”120 COPUOS suggested that the
State recall its role as a launching State under United Nations
treaties when enacting regulations, and further recommended
114
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that “[s]pace activities should require authorization by a
competent national authority” and “[t]he conditions for
authorization should be consistent with the international
obligations and commitments of States.”121 Forty states have
enacted laws that establish space agencies or in some way
regulate space activity.122 Generally, these states require either
a license or a permit to conduct space activities “within its
territory or by its residents, citizens or corporations anywhere in
the world.”123
In 1984, the United States passed the Commercial Space
Launch Act (“CSLA”),124 which has since been adopted in Chapter
509 of the United States Code.125 The CSLA was enacted “to
promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity through
[the] use of the space environment for peaceful purposes” and “to
encourage the United States private sector to provide launch
vehicles, reentry vehicles, and associated services.”126 It further
provides that “the Secretary of Transportation is to oversee and
coordinate the conduct of commercial launch and reentry
operations,
issue
permits
and
commercial
licenses . . . authorizing those operations, and protect the public
health and safety, safety of property, and national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States.”127
Under the CSLA, an issued or transferred license or permit
is required for any person to launch a launch vehicle, reenter a
reentry vehicle, or operate a launch or reentry site within the
United States.128 Additionally, an issued or tansferred license or
permit is required for any citizen to conduct the same activities
outside of the United States.129 “[P]erson” is defined as “an
individual and an entity organized or existing under the laws of a

121
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State or country,” meaning that these requirements apply to
private companies.130
To obtain a launch or reentry license, an individual or entity
must meet certain liability insurance or financial responsibility
requirements.131 The licensee or transferee must be able to
compensate, either through insurance or financial responsibility,
for the maximum probable loss from claims by “a third party for
death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an
activity carried out under the license” and from claims by “the
United States Government . . . for damage or loss to Government
property resulting from an activity carried out under the
license.”132 “Loss” is not defined by this act. Policies for thirdparty claims must protect the licensee, its customer, the United
States, United States agencies, government personnel, and any
contractors and subcontractors—and the employees of each—
involved in a licensed activity from “their respective potential
liabilities against covered claims.”133 Policies for claims brought
by the United States government must also protect against
claims brought by American agencies or any government
contractors or subcontractors, and must protect the same parties
for any licensed activity.134
The exact maximum probable loss the licensee or transferee
must be able to compensate for is determined on a case-by-case
basis;135 however, the amount may not exceed $500,000,000 for
claims brought by third parties, or $100,000,000 for claims
brought by the United States government.136 These statutory
caps have been in place since the passage of the Commercial
Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988.137 Though the tier
system of liability was initially scheduled to expire five years
after the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments of 1988, these provisions have been extended
several times and are now in place until September 30, 2025.138
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In the event that a successful third-party claim surpasses
the required insurance or financial responsibility of a licensee or
transferee, the United States government will pay exceeding
damages up to $3.1 billion.139 This amount was limited to $1.5
billion at the time of the passage of the Commercial Space
Launch Act Amendments of 1988.140
However, unlike the
liability insurance or financial responsibility limitations, this
sum is statutorily adjusted for inflation.141 Should a successful
claim exceed the total required liability insurance or financial
responsibility in addition to the government-provided $3.1
billion, the licensee or transferee will be responsible for excess
damages.142
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) determines the
maximum probable loss that must be covered, which is “the
greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or property
damage that is reasonably expected to result from a launch or
reentry,”143 “based on an analysis and assessment of the
maximum monetary losses likely to be incurred . . . in the event
of a mishap.”144 The FAA uses a risk profile method to examine
thousands of discrete accident scenarios that can occur as a
result of a launch or reentry and to determine the expected
casualties and expected property damage.145 Though expected
property damage is measured in thousands of dollars, expected
casualties are measured in number of casualties, and therefore
the FAA multiplies this number by the cost of casualty—
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currently valued at $3 million—to determine the maximum
probable loss.146
III. THE MISSING PIECE: INDEMNIFICATION PROCEDURES
A treaty that is made under the authority of the United
States is given the same weight as laws passed by Congress—
both are considered the supreme law of the land.147 Accordingly,
the Secretary of Transportation must carry out Chapter 509 of
Title 51 of the United States Code consistent with any “obligation
the United States Government assumes in a treaty, convention,
or agreement in force between the Government and the
government of a foreign country.”148 Additionally, Chapter 509 of
Title 51 of the United States Code expressly finds that the
United States should regulate launches in a way that ensures
compliance with its international obligations.149 Therefore, the
United States’ obligations as a launching State under the
Liability Convention must be considered when examining
commercial space activity regulations set by the United States
government. This includes launch license requirements, though
the regulations never mention the Liability Convention or any
other treaty.
The current United States regulations do not define the term
“loss.”150 This absence presents potential gaps in understanding
what is encompassed in launch license requirements, given that
the licensees are required to obtain insurance that would
compensate for claims brought by the United States Government
or third parties for loss resulting from an activity carried out
under the license.151 However, the history of the Commercial
Space Launch Act provides some guidance.
The original version of the CSLA, passed in 1984, stated that
a licensee must have “liability insurance at least in such amount
as is considered by the Secretary to be necessary for such launch
or operation, considering the international obligations of the
United States.”152
Because the statute mentions no
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considerations other than the United States’ international
obligations, such as those under the Liability Convention, it is
clear that Congress included liability insurance requirements to
protect itself as a launching State against claims from other
nations.153 Additionally, the 1988 amendments to the CSLA,
which introduced the current risk-sharing regime, were
implemented to help private launch providers in the United
States remain competitive on a global scale.154 The amendments’
supporters argued that it was in the best interest of the United
States to introduce these policies because the United States
would remain protected regardless of whether liability caps and
risk-sharing procedures were implemented.155
These policies were implemented while considering the
international obligations of the United States, not in spite of
these obligations.156 The liability caps simultaneously reflected a
desire to protect both the government and private launch
providers from limitless liability and demonstrated commitment
to holding companies accountable for launch activities, thus
ensuring that companies will pursue advancement in a
responsible way without stifling growth of the industry.157
Accordingly, when licensees are required to obtain insurance to
compensate for claims brought by “the United States
Government . . . for damage or loss to Government property
resulting from an activity carried out under the license,” the term
“loss” can include financial loss suffered by the United States
Government as a result of successful claims brought against the
United States, as a launching State, by another country under
the Liability Convention.158
It is possible that the United States never brings a claim
against a private launch provider for losses suffered as a result of
Liability Convention claims; the Liability Convention claims
would be considered third-party claims, and launch insurance
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policies for third-party claims must protect the United States.159
Under the CSLA, a third party means a person—an individual or
an entity organized or existing under the laws of a State or
country—other than the United States Government or its
contractors or subcontractors; a licensee or transferee; the
licensee’s or transferee’s contractors, subcontractors, or
customers; the customer’s contractors or subcontractors; or crew,
government astronauts, or space flight participants.160
Therefore, a claimant State could be considered a third party
bringing a claim against a party protected by launch insurance.
However, because the current regulations make no mention
of the Liability Convention or any other international obligations,
there is no established process the United States Government
would use if it were found liable for compensatory damages
under the Liability Convention due to a private company’s
launching activities.161 While the Liability Convention imposes
clear standards of liability assumption for launching States, the
United States regulations do not describe the level of fault a
licensee may or must assume below the imposed liability cap.162
Though the United States Government can participate in the
defense of claims brought against licensees by third parties, it is
unclear whether licensees could participate in the defense of the
United States as a launching State against claims brought under
the Liability Convention.163 This could potentially put the United
States government at risk of assuming complete responsibility
for compensating a claimant State or assuming more
responsibility than appropriate, because a licensee could argue
against an assumption of liability even if the United States has
already assumed liability under the Liability Convention.
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No country has ever brought claims against the United
States as a launching State under the Liability Convention.164
Therefore, there has never been an occasion in which a private
launch provider would have needed to indemnify the United
States government for compensation owed to another country
under the Liability Convention, and there is no precedent to rely
upon to gain an understanding of how such an indemnification
would proceed.165 That the Liability Convention has only been
invoked once–in the claims brought by Canada against the
USSR,–166 is not necessarily an indication that there will be few
claims brought under the treaty in the future. As the private
space launch industry grows, private launch providers have
exhibited a willingness to risk failure on the path to
advancement.167 This could mean an increase in damage and
claims for compensation that would fall within the purview of the
Liability Convention.
The issue of how the United States government should be
repaid for compensatory damages paid to a claimant State as a
result of the launching activities of a private company could still
arise. The CSLA can be interpreted to mean either that the
government would need to bring an indemnification action
against the licensee to be repaid for such damages up to $100
million, or that the claimant State is bringing a claim for thirdparty damages and that the licensee responsible for the
compensation up to $500 million.168 The current procedures in
domestic regulations need to be clarified; they are ambiguous and
provide little guidance to the government and to private
companies. Other nations with similar interests and domestic
regulations as the United States have implemented
indemnification procedures that can serve as a model for
replication in the United States.
IV. LOOKING TO OTHER COUNTRIES FOR GUIDANCE
The United States is not the only nation that has had to
balance a desire for growth of domestic private launch providers
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and a need to honor its international obligations.169 Twentythree nations, including the United States, have some type of
compulsory insurance requirements as of 2019.170 Fifteen of
these nations have compulsory insurance requirements for
claims brought by third parties and all but two of the nations
that have compulsory insurance requirements mandate
insurance to protect against government loss.171 Some of these
nations, such as Norway and Sweden, allow for insurance
requirements to be decided at the discretion of the government,
with no liability cap.172 Other nations, such as Australia and
France, utilize maximum probable loss calculations, just like the
United States.173 These nations have extensive regulations and
include explicit indemnification procedures that may be useful in
considering how the United States might amend and revamp its
domestic regulations.174
A.

Australia’s Space (Launch and Returns) Act of 2018

The Space (Launch and Returns) Act 2018 (“SLRA”) went
into effect in Australia on August 31, 2019.175 Like the CSLA, the
SLRA was implemented to balance “the removal of barriers to
participation in space activities and the encouragement of
innovation and entrepreneurship in the space industry” with “the
safety of space activities, and the risk of damage to persons or
property as a result of space activities.”176 The SLRA also seeks
“to implement certain of Australia’s obligations under the UN
Space Treaties,”177 and not only references but also directly
adopts language from the Liability Convention.178
169
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As a part of the SLRA’s regulations of liability for damages
caused by space objects, the SLRA specifically addresses
“[c]ompensation claims by foreign countries.”179 The SLRA states
that if a foreign country presents claims against Australia for
compensation for damage under the Liability Convention and
“Australia becomes liable to any extent to pay compensation for
the damage,” then “[t]he responsible party for the relevant
launch . . . is liable to pay the Commonwealth an amount equal
to the lesser of” either “the amount of that compensation
[or] . . . the insured amount for the permit.”180 The SLRA defines
the “responsible party” in the event of a “launch or return
authorised by an Australian launch permit” as “the holder of the
permit,” precluding any argument about who is responsible for
paying damages.181 Therefore, if Australia is held liable as a
launching State under the Liability Convention, then the party
that held the permit for the failed launch must compensate
Australia either for the total compensation Australia owes the
claimant State or the amount for which the permit holder was
insured for the launch. This procedure is an example of how a
licensee can be held responsible for compensating the
government directly up to the insured amount. Additionally, the
SLRA does not require the Commonwealth to bring a claim
against the responsible party to prove that the party owes
damages to the Australian government.182
This section of the SLRA directly follows other regulations
that explain liability for third-party damages and procedures for
claims brought by third parties.183 In defining procedures for
third-party damages, the SLRA states that if a foreign country
presents a claim against Australia under the Liability
Convention or otherwise under international law, and “such a
claim made by a foreign country has been settled,” then “a person
who has suffered damage covered by the claim may not
commence an action, against the responsible party, seeking
compensation for that damage.”184
This language and the
placement of the regulations addressing claims brought by
foreign countries indicate that while Australia considers claims
179
180
181
182
183
184
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brought directly against a responsible party to be a third-party
claim, claims brought under the Liability Convention are not
third-party claims, and therefore need to be addressed
separately. If the United States adopted the sentiments of the
Australian regulations, it would remove any temptation to
consider claims brought under the Liability Convention against
the United States as third-party claims and would instead clarify
that the private launch providers would be responsible for
repaying the government up to the required insurance amount.
B. The French Space Operations Act
Arianespace, a major commercial launch provider, launches
from a facility in French Guiana in South America.185
Accordingly, the French government is a launching State for any
Arianespace launch from the spaceport in French Guiana.186 The
French Space Operations Act (“FSOA”), passed in 2008, governs
liability for France’s space activities.187 The FSOA adopted the
liability standards of the Liability Convention, and holds the
operator, defined as “any natural or juridical person carrying out
a space operation under its responsibility and independently,”188
absolutely liable for damages caused on the ground or in airspace
and “liable only due to his fault for damages caused elsewhere
than on the ground or in airspace” in the case of damage to third
parties.189
Article 14 of the FSOA refers to an operator’s liability to the
French government and references both the Outer Space Treaty
and the Liability Convention.190 Specifically, the FSOA states
that if the French Government has paid compensation under the
Liability Convention, “it may present a claim for indemnification
against the operator having caused the damage for which France
was held internationally liable, to the extent that the
Government has not already benefitted from the insurance . . . up
185
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to the amount of the compensation.”191
This language
demonstrates that the French government does not consider
claims brought under the Liability Convention to be third-party
claims against an operator, and the government will not present
a claim for indemnification if damage occurs as a result of an
operation that is licensed and targets governmental interests.192
While these provisions are not as clear as the Australian
regulations and leave open questions regarding whether an
operator could argue that it did not cause the damage for which
France was held internationally liable, they do directly address
the Liability Convention and provide some guidance as to how
the French government would proceed if a claim was brought
under the Liability Convention.
The regulations express
straightforward standards for liability assumption, and therefore
put private launch providers on notice as to the extent to which
companies can be held liable should damage occur from launch
activities.193 The FSOA also makes clear that the government
will take full responsibility, without bringing an indemnification
action against an operator, if a mission targets governmental
interests, though the term “governmental interests” is not
defined.194
C. Benefits to the United States
The risk-sharing system embedded into United States
regulations provides security to both private launch providers
and the government by protecting both parties from potentially
limitless liability.195 Because private launch providers will be
responsible for damage that results from launch activities, the
system, in turn, protects the public by ensuring private
companies embrace risk in a responsible manner. At the same
time, it allows the private launch industry to grow: companies
are responsible for damages only up to the required insurance
amount, provided damages are not more than $3.1 billion.
However, this shared security is undermined by the lack of
clarity in domestic regulations regarding the procedures that
would follow if the United States was found liable as a launching
State under the Liability Convention for the actions of a private
191
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launch provider. The United States faces potentially unlimited
liability if a private launch provider takes advantage of gaps in
domestic regulations to avoid compensating the government for
damages paid to a claimant State. On the other hand, private
launch providers are not given notice of the extent of damages
that might potentially need to be repaid, because it is not clear
whether claims brought under the Liability Convention would be
considered third-party claims or if the government would need to
bring a separate action against private launch providers.
Adopting (1) language explicitly stating that Liability
Convention claims are not third-party claims, as Australia and
France have done, and (2) indemnification procedures similar to
those implemented in Australia, would make clear that private
launch providers must repay the United States government for
compensatory damages paid to a claimant State, but only up to
$100 million. This would not only protect the United States from
the possibility of assuming total responsibility, but also protect
private launch providers from paying up to $500 million in
damages without notice.
CONCLUSION
While the United States launch license requirements
prioritize the growth of the private sector in providing launch
services, they only address the international obligations of the
United States in a cursory and implicit manner. This is
particularly relevant in a time of significant growth of private
space activities, including launches provided by the private
sector, because this growth is accompanied by increased risk.
The current United States regulations provide no guidance as to
which procedures would be implemented should the United
States government be found liable as a launching State under the
Liability Convention because of actions taken by private launch
providers.
This puts the United States government in a
vulnerable position—the lack of procedures could prevent the
United States from successfully indemnifying the party
responsible for damages that the United States is obligated to
pay a claimant State under the Liability Convention. It also fails
to give private launch providers adequate notice as to the extent
of damages they may be required to pay. Therefore, it would be
in the best interest of the United States to adopt explicit
indemnification procedures that directly address claims brought
against the United States under the Liability Convention, such
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as the procedures codified in Australian and French law; to
provide clarity; security; and notice to all involved parties.

